Turkey, a special partner

The President of the EU Commission & the President of Turkey

Alain Navarra-Navassartian

A few weeks ago, a map appeared on ARTE's program 28 Minutes. The map depicted Turkey and the South Caucasus region, but Armenia was missing. While we won't discuss the power of images through the lens of speech-act theory here, it's worth noting that certain statements don't describe or report anything; rather, they perform the action they articulate. Similarly, images can convey a latent potential to act. Here, we have an image-act that influences both thought and action.

As Jacques Lacan said, "A failed act is a successful discourse." This may explain the outcry from much of the Armenian diaspora in France. Yet, few noticed that one of Armenian origin was among the journalists present before the map and remained silent in the face of Armenia's erasure. This silence is striking, especially when followed by a segment portraying Turkey as a democracy.

While the journalist's claim bears little resemblance to the reality challenged by tens of thousands of demonstrators in Turkey, it reflects a widespread desire to view Turkey as a partner and potential EU member that actively contributes to Europe's defense architecture.

"Turkey, a special partner" is not the title of an '80s new wave song but rather a new way of relating to Ankara. It requires breaking with existing paradigms and creating new frameworks for cooperation. Consider the EU-Turkey deal during the 2015 "migration crisis," for example—a textbook case of a poorly negotiated partnership yielding morally untenable outcomes. A wall was built between Turkey and Syria, and the EU provided €83 million worth of surveillance equipment and armored vehicles for border patrols.

In the early stages of the Syrian crisis, Turkey invested heavily in symbolic capital by welcoming refugees. However, by 2016, these refugees had become bargaining chips between Ankara and a divided Europe. Inside Turkey, they were increasingly seen as unwanted. Some in the population turned them into scapegoats. The solidarity of the early days gave way to rejection. Although Syrians were theoretically permitted to apply for work permits, informal labor remained—and still remains—their most common route. This led to direct competition with Turkish workers. Syrians are now perceived as unfair competitors in both the formal and informal sectors.

Around 6,000 legal businesses have been established by Syrians in Turkey, but it is estimated that up to 20,000 operate informally. Amid a recession and an AKP government sliding into open authoritarianism, refugees became collateral damage in Turkey's political transformation. As early as 2019, NGOs reported mass deportations. Financial transparency for refugee infrastructure remains opaque, and socioeconomic support is minimal.

The March 17–18 agreements between Turkey and the EU may reveal more than plans for another wall between Greece and Turkey.

In Arte's “28 Minutes”, Armenia wiped off the map

Democratic Turkey?

The arrest of Istanbul's mayor was described by the opposition as a "civilian coup d'état," sparking the largest wave of protests in over a decade. Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, fearing that Turkey was becoming a classic dictatorship—an illiberal regime no longer concerned with maintaining democratic appearances or a viable opposition capable of winning elections.

Voter turnout remains high in Turkey. The 2024 municipal elections were a bitter defeat for Erdoğan and his party. The political game was further rigged with the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu. The ruling party seeks to reshape the opposition to its liking by eliminating genuine competition. The university that once awarded Imamoğlu his degrees now discredits them, casting doubt on his eligibility for the presidency, which requires a college degree.

The dismantling of liberal constitutionalism is nothing new. Judicial independence, civil liberties, and checks and balances began to erode early in Erdoğan's tenure. Initial reforms brought new working-class groups to power, expanding the reach of the AKP beyond its traditional Islamist base. Erdoğan integrated classical Islamist themes while adapting them to modern contexts. Positioning itself as a "clean" party ("ak" means "white" in Turkish), the AKP capitalized on demands for political moralization by promoting social justice and claiming to defend the will of the people.

This hybrid approach revitalized social mobility. In the 2000s, Turkey experienced significant economic growth. Small Anatolian entrepreneurs gained access to power, reshaping class relations. Paradoxically, Islamic identity became a lens through which to view Turkey's social diversity. Initially, the AKP championed ethnic and religious pluralism, recognizing Kurdish cultural rights and showing tentative openness toward the Armenian Genocide—balancing national identity with multiculturalism.

However, from 2010 onward, the marginalization and even repression of certain groups accelerated, including secular elites, the military, Kemalists from the CHP, and civil servants. Turkey began posing as a model democracy underpinned by nationalism and Islamism.

The 2010 constitutional referendum foreshadowed the impending power grab. The Constitutional Court was restructured, with the number of members reduced from 17 to seven. In 2014, a law gave the Justice Minister the power to appoint judges. Though deemed unconstitutional, this law enabled the widespread appointment of prosecutors and magistrates loyal to the regime.

In 2018, Erdoğan claimed that Turkey was offering the world a lesson in democracy. In truth, however, this marked the culmination of his personal rule. The 2016 state of emergency enabled him to govern by decree. Tens of thousands of civil servants, including judges and academics, were purged; 40,000 people were jailed; and thousands of passports were confiscated. Erdoğan now heads the state, the government, and the party, and his powers far exceed those of presidents in other systems. Legislative and judicial checks are nearly nonexistent.

Erdoğan clings to democratic legitimacy by leveraging popular support. However, Turkish populism predates him. Kemalism's six principles are based on an elite-led distrust of the people. The AKP has fully embraced populism. Erdoğan speaks directly to the "people" while discrediting dissent. Representative democracy becomes both a tool of legitimization and a shield against EU demands.

This allows him to dismiss protests as irrelevant compared to electoral victories. However, his "people" are a purified, sanitized construct, free of disruptive elements. The regime claims to restore the popular voice, yet it penetrates daily life and social norms. Despite Turkey's formal secularism, religion saturates public space. The AKP's version of Islam fosters dominant norms and tighter state control.

Still, hundreds of thousands demonstrate. The demand for democracy endures.

The Europeans' Desire for Turkey

Many leaders seem unconcerned that people demand democracy. Recently, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte urged closer EU-Turkey ties, especially regarding defense.

Yet, in February 2025, Turkey blocked the sharing of information on NATO capability targets. Turkey is an unreliable and complex partner that seeks to appear indispensable to Europe's evolving security framework. "No one gives orders to Turkey anymore," proclaimed Star, a pro-government daily newspaper. In April, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Paris to discuss EU relations and denounced the racism targeting Turkish citizens in France. The irony is not lost.

The war in Ukraine has increased Turkey's influence. Ankara participated in recent "Coalition of the Willing" meetings in London and Paris. Diplomatic realism shields Erdoğan from scrutiny. Western capitals either look away or express "regret" as repression intensifies.

Domination as a mode of governance is not new in Turkey. Authority rests on a belief system that fosters obedience. However, the youth may be breaking the cycle.

Erdoğan continues to invoke the idea of a loyal people while excluding dissent. What new repressive reforms await? The Gezi protests of 2013 were followed by many. Nationalism is surging. However, the Turkish nation relies on exclusion. Government-aligned media, compliant intellectuals, and a politicized judiciary determine who belongs.

Today's protesters are not Erdoğan's "authentic people" of 2013 but rather "bandits" and internal enemies who threaten the Turkish fortress. Nationalist rhetoric intensifies and is peppered with conspiracy theories. As Şerif Mardin noted, conspiracism functions as political theory in Turkey.

The "us versus them" dichotomy justifies violence and seeks mass approval. Yet, on March 29, nearly 2.2 million Turks protested, and 73% support the movement, according to a Konda poll. Among 20- to 30-year-olds, 90% are dissatisfied with democracy (2022 data). Their signs and slogans often combine humor with powerful criticism.

However, Western chancelleries have "more pressing matters": Ukraine, fears of U.S. disengagement, and Turkey’s military clout. These issues outweigh questions of legitimacy.

Conspiracy charges target the opposition, and dissent becomes dangerous. An ideological arsenal reframes opposition as confrontation. Civil society is deemed unfit and requires top-down discipline. This isn’t unique to Erdoğan; it echoes both Ottoman and Kemalist traditions. The state remains an unaccountable organizing force. Ziya Gökalp's nationalist positivism shaped the belief in a rational state that acts "despite and for the people."

Remember the Manzikert commemorations? Flanked by actors in Seljuk armor, Erdoğan echoed Alp Arslan's rhetoric. He declared that Turkey must again become a regional—even global—power. But do we truly share a common definition of the enemy in defense matters?

As a partner, Turkey demands not only lucidity from Europe, but also courage—the courage not to yield to every provocation. It's easy to conduct a nuisance policy when Turkey is involved in multiple conflicts: Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Aegean Sea. Turkish imperial nostalgia fuels an ideology of a historic mission. Erdoğan portrays himself as the heroic protector of a perpetually threatened Turkey.

The EU’s ambition for strategic autonomy is complicated by its prospective cooperation with non-European powers, especially Turkey. Erdoğan leverages this to his advantage. However, claims that Turkey's authoritarian drift stems from the EU's reluctance to grant accession oversimplify the issue, ignoring domestic repression and political calculation.

Strategic partnerships take precedence over democratic concerns. The EU faces a clear dilemma: recognizing Turkey’s regional importance while avoiding the appearance of endorsing autocracy. This requires thoughtful navigation between strategic necessity and foundational democratic values.

Ultimately, EU-Turkey relations encapsulate the tension between regional security, accession politics, and democratic standards, all of which are intensified by rapidly shifting sociopolitical realities.

Musical Chairs

During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Turkey has played—and continues to play—a significant role. President Zelensky described Turkey as a strategic partner. The two countries have strengthened their military cooperation: the Kızılelma and Bayraktar drones are powered by Ukrainian Ivchenko-Progress engines. This sheds light on Zelensky's congratulations to Ilham Aliyev for his victory over the Armenians, as TB2 drones are now produced in a factory near Kyiv.

Nevertheless, Turkey has never ceased its economic cooperation with Russia. As highlighted in a previous article, in its ambition to become a regional energy hub, the country hosts strategic infrastructure enabling Russian gas to reach Turkish soil directly. The TurkStream pipeline connects Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea: one branch supplies the Turkish market, while the other extends into the Balkans, bypassing Ukraine.

In 2022, Erdoğan spoke of creating an "international distribution center" in northwestern Turkey, near Greece and Bulgaria. Although this announcement stirred some reluctance in Europe, Turkey remains heavily dependent on Russia for energy: in 2021, 45% of consumed gas came from Gazprom.

Other projects, including the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, are progressing rapidly. Despite the country's financial difficulties, this project—albeit scaled down (one reactor instead of two)—is financed by Russian banks. But this contract raises numerous questions about Turkey's energy and political independence. Erdoğan is thus pursuing an all-out energy diplomacy: South Korea, China, Russia, and even a Canadian company are competing to build a second or even a third nuclear plant.

As for Turkish exports to Russia, they totaled €10.9 billion in 2023, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). Turkey’s diplomatic dance between Russia, Ukraine, and the West is anything but cost-free: it is a lucrative waltz.

However, the recent political crisis has exposed a profound lack of confidence in the Turkish economic system. This is evident in the collapse of the Turkish lira, the dramatic surge in 10-year interest rates, and the plunge of the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Within hours, this "evaporation" of trust revealed the instability of an economic policy seen as unpredictable and tainted by authoritarianism.

In response, the Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT) was forced to intervene to stabilize the currency, resulting in a loss of $11.5 billion in foreign exchange reserves. The lira eventually stabilized around 38 per US dollar. The increase in the key interest rate, after a prolonged period of decline, reflects an attempt to restore market confidence. But this effort runs into the credibility gap of the political leadership.

It is clear that international economic actors—particularly those in financial markets—base their decisions not on democratic principles or the rule of law, but on the predictability of Erdoğan's leadership. And it is precisely this predictability that his authoritarianism undermines. An unpredictable leader raises concerns, including within his own country.

Meanwhile, the Turkish population is bearing the systemic effects of an economic policy that has favored wealth accumulation among elites close to power—notably after the failed 2016 coup, when businesses were seized and handed over to regime allies—to the detriment of the working class.

The data is telling. According to the WID database, the richest 1% in Turkey capture 23.9% of distributed income, while the poorest 50% receive only 14.1%. Despite a slight improvement in real wages, they remain below their 1990 historical levels. Disillusionment runs deep, and precariousness is growing. More than 13.6% of Turkish households now live in poverty.

Turkey’s economic dynamics thus reveal a deep tension between Erdoğan’s political strategy and on-the-ground realities. On one hand, he seeks to project an image of prosperity and security to win over economic classes—a narrative championed in particular by his Economy Minister, a former UBS and Merrill Lynch executive. On the other hand, inflation and consumer mistrust are eroding this discourse's credibility.

In this context, recourse to military policies—interventions in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, the development of the defense industry—reflects a strategy aimed at maintaining power by leveraging authoritarian tools in the face of economic crisis. This militarization diverts attention while deepening social inequalities, despite official claims of an "inclusive growth" policy.

The Turkish youth and those committed to the rule of law now stand alone

Turkey’s youth and all those committed to a genuine rule of law now stand alone. Civil society actors, including academics, lawyers, artists, and journalists, as well as independent media, are being repressed and arrested, largely without objection from the traditional "moral watchdogs" of the West.

For example, Elon Musk allowed opposition accounts to be blocked during protests. The European Union's lukewarm criticism does little to prepare for a post-Erdoğan era, which could allow for a renewed relationship with Turkey. This universe of ambiguous statements inspires neither moral nor intellectual respect. It reveals only a guilty weakness.

Let us not forget Europe’s feeble reaction to the 2015 "migrant crisis," or Germany's dismissal of concerns expressed by Cyprus and Greece in 2020. This occurred even as Erdoğan’s team embraced the Mavi Vatan ("Blue Homeland") doctrine, which has Eurasianist and military overtones.

The wars in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh raise a core question about the role of jihadist proxies that Turkey has deployed since 2011 as part of its anti-Kurdish strategy.

Is Turkey, under Erdoğan’s personalist regime, truly a reliable partner? More importantly, how should we prepare for the post-Erdoğan era?

This requires a multidimensional evaluation of political stability, economic conditions, diplomatic engagement, commitment to shared values, and reliability within security alliances. Relationships must be based on trust and firmness to enable a more balanced power dynamic.

Today, we are witnessing a guilty—even criminal—tolerance of the erosion of law and international norms. This has repercussions within our own democracies. How can we speak of "democratic communities" when we tolerate political violence and the exclusion of minority groups within the very regimes charged with defending Europe?

Welcoming new partners is a legitimate strategic choice, but only if those partners are reliable. Otherwise, Europe’s security will be shaped from the outside. Rather than consolidating current relations with Turkey, we should envision reframing those relations to escape the recurring cycle of coercion, blackmail, and submission.