Alain Navarra-Navassartian. PhD Sociology. PhD Art History.

Armenia is a small country, a fact often put forward to underline the danger posed by its neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan, but it is also an emerging country. This is a concept coined by the World Bank to underline a country's vocation for sustained development. Emphasis is therefore placed on the strong potential of the Armenian economy, which seems to have opted for total adherence to liberal principles and the international vision of virtuous liberalism. We should also point out that the criteria used to define small countries cover a wide range, reminding us that it is important to have as broad a knowledge and data base as possible to grasp the reality of a small country.
The work of researchers in the 1970s was decisive in taking into account the material resources of states and their willingness to employ them, as well as the notion of power, but the 1990s saw the emergence of new non-state actors who would counter and challenge traditional diplomacy. Other researchers have challenged a geopolitics that offers a vision of a fixed world and a determinism that often claims to be scientific, questioning the immutable rules of a system based on the balance of power. Yet the war in Ukraine has changed all that. The resurgence of power, the illiberal challenge clearly represented by many states in Europe and around the world, the war-induced recession, Europe's fall from economic power, its domestic market which is no longer the world's largest, and many other factors show that the accumulation of resources does not necessarily grant mastery of the international game.
In this context, can Armenia, which is seeking new partners as part of a radical rapprochement with the West, hold its own in an international system that is undergoing change?
FROM BI-POLAR WORLD TO MULTI-ALIGNMENT
The international system seems more complex and less legible than in the 1990s. A multi-polar or multi-aligned world (Sheya Upadhyay.2022), or even a world of “partners”, aping globalization as a means of combating the particularisms that are dangerous to the functioning of the liberal order. There would therefore be room for a logic other than power, and an emerging country like Armenia would have a card to play, despite having lost a war, 5,000 men and a chaotic peace process. Heading west, then, we formalize EU membership in the same way as with the USA, by signing a partnership charter. What's interesting is that, while this charter includes the traditional aspects of security, the economy and energy, it also includes aspects dealing with justice and democracy. This follows on from other measures, such as joining the ICC in February 2024, while Wladimir Putin has been under arrest warrant since 2023. The point here is not to discuss the merits of such a charter or other decisions, but to see what the opportunities would be for Armenia in this new context of partnership.
The integration of Armenia into its regional environment is the solution chosen by the government as well as by its partners, the EU and the USA. It is often on regional cooperation that small countries rely to defend their interests, so it's a question of policy and the application of certain techniques that will have to accompany these new choices. There are, however, a few problems with this “re-enchantment” of the Armenian situation: Azerbaijan takes a very dim view of this set of measures, such as the 2-year postponement of the EU civilian mission on Armenia's borders, but on the other hand, part of the population does not believe in the narrative that accompanies the peace talks and this turn towards the West. All the players involved in the conflict and its resolution are not entirely in agreement. Beyond state interactions, there are social dynamics that need to be taken into account in Armenia as elsewhere, and which are reshaping the international system: domination as well as the “return” of power or war can no longer do without the social fabric.
Although multilateralism is today strongly contested, it remains a widely-used diplomatic technique: concerted action between at least 3 States within a jointly-defined framework. Armenia adheres to this diplomacy, which has a political corollary: the regulation of inter-State relations by international organizations or the UN system. The fact remains that in many countries, multilateralism no longer appears to be the solution for resolving certain conflicts, just like the loss of confidence in the universalism that it embodies in its project.all the more so since Trump's “America first” policy is undermining the concept from within. Donald Trump's simplistic ideas were followed by strong “gaps” in the promotion of European values. What is more serious is that certain European decisions appear to be real breaches of these values.
Who can still believe in international law when, on a daily basis, we see that impunity, backed by a strategic rout on the part of Europeans, leaves the way clear for crimes committed by treacherous states? Or when interests (or cowardice) take precedence over all ethics, since what we are witnessing is a retreat from the law, among other things. It's a violation of human rights and an impotence of the law that will have repercussions even in our democracies. Are we facing the disappearance of a “democratic community”?
As Hannah Arendt pointed out, it is on the denunciation of lies (particularly in politics) that the awakening of ethical awareness is based, enabling us to dissociate values and interests, in other words, to attempt to think on a universal scale.
Should we always be confronted with relativism?
The wars in Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Ukraine and Armenia have raised questions in many Asian and African countries about this universalism of values, which sometimes takes the form of a double standard.
While analysis using other criteria does not entirely call into question the international system focused on the notion of power, there are some important changes that need to be taken into account: changes in conflicts and conflictuality, interdependence and globalization, which call into question sovereignty and, beyond the borders of a State, the idea of territory. In these strategic recompositions, it is therefore important for Armenia not to allow itself to be pigeonholed into one “category”, but to consider a whole range of tactics and partners. We can see how important it has been for Azerbaijan to state the reality of the conflict, the better to impose a subjective vision of the country and the Armenians. Armenia is effectively stuck in a certain configuration of power in its geographical area, but it also possesses many instruments to influence its environment.
Rearmament is undoubtedly one of the keys to its security, as is a valid command structure and a military doctrine as an intellectual construct that can best guide military operations and military personnel. But there are many other strategies studied by researchers in international relations: neutrality, balancing, band wagonning and so on. But it is just as important to pay attention to the ordinary social fact of the country: without minimizing the discontent or misunderstandings of the population, the search for a strong consensus within the population as well as within the political-administrative elite of the country is an important factor for new approaches to “power” and its modes of action. Any country that loses a war does not retain the same material and symbolic resources, so the state must implement a policy of meaning to enable the construction of meaning for the community. Once again, the point here is not to discuss the validity of the means used to achieve this - we've done that in several texts - but to underline the need to set up schemes for interpreting reality after defeat and, above all, the loss of 5,000 men. We could just point out that the means used to enable Armenians to perceive or identify actions that make sense of a delicate and particular situation are not always well understood.
“Arménie, carrefour de la paix” (Armenia, crossroads of peace) certainly has this ambition, as do the various summits and congresses held in Yerevan over the past two years, but it fails to take account of the historical and social dynamics that construct a population's identity. ‘The crossroads of peace’, which seems to be a concept straight out of an American think tank, is not very well suited to political, social or cultural imaginations battered by defeat. If the notion of territory is being called into question by globalization, Armenian territorial identity goes beyond the simple visible materiality of the border. The human drama represented by this war cannot be glossed over with liberal varnish or American rappers, all the more so as the infallibility of the State is one of the major challenges facing Western societies, to which Armenia wishes to draw closer.
The justice of history does not seem to intervene, once again, for the Armenian people in Artsakh as in 1915, and this is once again a form of mourning, the mourning of thousands of men but also the mourning of a “before” and an “after” but also of a “within” and a “beyond” a border. For Armenians and diasporics alike, a new imaginary must be put in place as we come to terms with the eternal price we have to pay for our existence.
It is in this sense that the Tavush movement was interesting: it is both an opposition to a social order that appears to be an imposition of the international order by national actors, and a questioning of the fabric of the Nation. The territorial restructuring that followed the discussions on borders awakened different social imaginations in the government and in part of the population. Building an acceptable idea of community after this cataclysm is surely one of the government's necessary undertakings.
We cannot repeat often enough that 2018 is a time of civil disobedience, preceded by the events of 2015, which demonstrated that Armenians have rejected the fatality of domination. The narrative in government communication must take into account a set of factors that are more complex than they appear, and it is not the liberal religion and its morality of efficiency that can substitute for local reflection.
Rewriting Armenian history to make room for the history of Armenia is also a particularly interesting act, since it underlines the desire to write the history of the development of the state rather than the episodes of the state's non-existence. We might just point out that this transformation into a state people comes at a time of contestation of this concept and of forms of authority, and that since the 1990s in all Western countries, lack of imagination or knowledge is often a blight on a government. When political illusion takes precedence over real strategies, or worse still, over a desire to sweep aside the fact that it must also intervene in people's minds, it forgets that it's not just a question of applying imported precepts, but also of acting on what Pierre Hassner defined as the “positive passions” of a population. There is not only a political response to this disaster, but also a sociological one. While for many, democracy remains an unfinished and evolving system, the Armenian government seems to be applying recipes rather than reflecting on the construction of the Armenian state and the various possibilities open to it. It's not a question of discussing the end or not of the nation-state (whose antiquity is not so obvious and whose emergence is not as natural as some would have us believe, just as the mythology of the Westphalian treaties needs to be revised), but of pointing out that there are other alternative trajectories for the establishment of political communities, and that political imagination would be a strength for Armenia at a time when the straitjacket of the state is holding it back. Why, for example, should only states benefit from all rights, to the detriment of other collective entities? You might say that for a small country to challenge the Westphalian myth is no easy matter, but to think about and envisage other possibilities for governmental organization in the aftermath of this catastrophe would also be a strength for a small country, capable of breaking out of the theoretical frameworks imposed on it.
LOSING A WAR
Losing a war is as much a collective trauma as a military situation, and it creates tensions between the desire for renewal and the fear of seeing the dissolution of what exists of the national identity, a certain conservatism that would like to avoid overly violent political transformations. The difficult end to the war, which led to the exile of the Armenian population of Artsakh and the death of five thousand men, had an impact on Armenian political organization.
How to admit defeat? It's both a moral and a political question. Defeat is a political issue, and the sense of loss is linked to the conception of a failed history, a never-ending cycle of pogroms and massacres that culminated in the genocide of 1915. We need to study the various attitudes to this reality of defeat, those of social groups and individuals in Yerevan and the provinces, for example, in order to work on interpreting the meaning of this war. It should be pointed out that, during the diaspora summit, no diaspora group expressed the wish to pay their respects at Yerablur (military cemetery). Memory, like forgetting, is a political tool, and N. Pashinyan's latest statements in Zurich on his questions about the genocide are enlightening. The government talks a lot about the state and fostering a “culture of the state”, but if we don't want the authority of the state to be rejected, it's not enough to try and convince people that we're dealing with a “creative defeat” heralding a new Armenia freed from a cumbersome memory. As for the confused remarks made in Zurich, they suggest a real public policy of forgetting, a policy of anti-memory. It's not a question of defending or not defending a salutary policy of forgetting, because those who are paying the price for the time being are the Armenians alone, supported in an incongruous and absurd manner by a government that believes that a population's representations of defeat fade all the faster as promises of economic development abound. There is indeed a desire to deprive Armenian individuals of their power to tell their own stories, encouraged by a policy of avoidance on the part of a section of the diaspora that does not yet grasp the danger of these practices. This “commandment to forget” seems to have been decreed to facilitate talks with Azerbaijan, and beyond that, Turkey.
“Armenia Crossroads of Peace”, a concept that seems to have come directly from an American think-tank, underlines the government's determination to recreate a collective communion endangered by the cataclysm of 2020. It's not a question of national sentiment, but of underlining how important it is to appropriate a painful reality, to give it meaning, so that the solidarity of Armenian groups doesn't disintegrate, completing Azerbaijan's work. It's not a question of falling into the logic of resentment, with no other horizon, but the quest for concord and the success of transactions by the most absurd means are no guarantee of success. The political rent of a government based on a democratic transition, which pleases its partners of the moment, but also on the will to deprive social actors of the possibility of telling their own story, the evacuation of the punishable nature of an act such as the genocide of 1915, the prohibition of evoking an event, or even the erasure of its material traces with the intention of writing a univocal history, in no way guarantees this rent in the long term.
The process of pacification has not turned out to be as straightforward as many of those involved in the conflict would have wished, for the violence did not stop with the end of hostilities, but took many forms: prisoners of war and political prisoners, amusement parks, official and performative speeches by President Aliyev and his government, the systematic destruction of Armenian cultural heritage, and so on. The trial in Baku in January 2025 is a parody in violation of international legal standards, and is becoming another living sore in a social memory that is being urged to forget in order to sanitize this defeat. Don't say too much, don't see too much. Being resilient is the watchword proposed to Armenians, here and there, an ideology of adaptation and consent to catastrophe.
It's not a question of minimizing mourning and the “moral economy of recognition” to be put in place after the war, but it's the conceptual box used that's up for discussion: how can we make sense of the unthought? Memory of a war that has become unspeakable for political or geopolitical reasons. A fragmentary memory, the umpteenth manifestation of an inflicted or chosen pathology affecting the Armenian social and political body.
Defeat is certainly partly the cause of the predatory governments of the past, but what else does it reveal? The incompetence of a general staff, the obvious obsolescence of equipment, or is it society as a whole that needs to be questioned?
This defeat is by no means an illustration of the essence of the Armenian people: an ideal expiatory victim before eternity. What we need to understand is how the war of the 1990s and the war of 2020 constituted a political matrix for Armenia, but also for Azerbaijan, putting in place a cluster of social, cultural and political practices that led, at the end of the war, to a system aimed at eliminating all Armenian presence in the region. So it's not by upsetting or destroying certain collective narratives at the origins of the feeling of attachment that unites a collective of individuals that we can restore national feeling. But it seems that the expressions of popular disarray in Armenia have not mobilized several scales of analysis, since it is a question not only of a collective social fact, but also of the consciousness of each Armenian individual and his or her relationship with institutions and the State in relation to this defeat. The aim is to recreate the cohesion of a society damaged by the experience of war and the loss of human life. But the proposed amnesia or readjustment of our people's history seems to be the useful remedy to appease public opinion, between self-censorship and official censorship, the realities of this war have remained under wraps. War is indeed the business of the state, but it also reveals the state that is waging this war, and certainly even more so in the peace process that follows the conflict, which reflects just as much the malaise in the construction of this process by the international system.
The combatants of the war in Artsakh have become disruptive factors, like the “fanatics” of genocide memory, in a liberal peace process destined for universality, which trades warlike semantics for “security” and “intervention”, and which will have to confront other forms of violence, those of the virilist authoritarians, Putin, Aliyev, Erdogan and their Western corollaries.
COMING OUT OF WAR
The process of emerging from war is a long one, analyzed by historians and historical anthropologists. This has made it possible to look at the experiences of civilian populations and the diversity of actors in a conflict, as well as public opinion and the imagination surrounding conflicts (see bibliography). The definition of borders, the Zangezur corridor and the restitution of villages in the north of the country have left their mark not only on the country's landscape and territory, but also on people's consciences and memories, and will do so for a long time to come. But the idea of peace as a return to pre-conflict normality is a questionable assumption. The scars are there in the bodies of soldiers, in their families and in society as a whole. The combatants of the 2020 war have had to face up to the modern technologies of remote warfare: armed drones, the Turkish TB2 bayraktar or the Israeli orbiter and harop kamikaze drones. On October 1, 2020, we still remember a clip revealing Azerbaijan's use of prowling munitions. The drone war has indeed taken place, doubled by a media and network war leaving a disenchanted vision of this conflict far from the heroism of the 1990s. The tear in the fabric of daily life that any war represents, the technological strength of Azerbaijan and the loss, in the course of the conflict, of the declared aims of the war on the Armenian side and the declaration of the real aims of the conflict (eradication of the Armenians from the region) on the Azerbaijani side, have upset the Armenian world, which wonders whether there will always be a ransom to pay for its existence.
What remains to be understood is the social dimension of this war, which mobilized the whole of Armenian society and its institutions, and the various organizational, communicational and technical measures put in place to manage the conflict.
RESHUFFLING THE CARDS
The political weight of a country like Armenia may be limited on a global scale, but there are a number of ways in which the country can become a “standards setter”. The view that a state's power is based solely on hard power, military might or traditional diplomacy is increasingly being called into question. Are power and hegemony the only concepts that can be considered for a place in the international system? Even if power remains a structuring notion in international relations, the concept is not set in stone and evolves according to a specific situation or relationship. It needs to be considered outside a fixist framework, and as an evolving notion.
If we consider the winner of the conflict, Azerbaijan, the notion of power seems to take on its full meaning in its ability to coerce, but its capacity to influence in other areas is diminishing. COP 29 is a good example: many people wondered why such an event should be held in a country that produces fossil fuels and flouts a large number of human rights. The expected result in terms of the country's image was therefore not achieved, all the more so as the government's reactions only served to heighten criticism: environmental activists were arrested, US parliamentarians were harassed, proximity to oil-producing countries, freedom of expression and assembly was not respected during the summit. The European Commissioner Michael O Flaherty called for an “end to the persecution of critical voices” on the sidelines of COP29.
The example of Azerbaijan is interesting, not only because of the conflict, but also because NGOs, social actors, the media and even religious actors are increasingly involved in defining rules and standards, and “bad reputation” seems to be more important than real ethics in international relations. But in this cross-fertilization of allegiances in the South Caucasus region, the proponents of virtuous globalization seem to prefer Armenia, for the time being. Accepting that force dictates the law calls into question, for Western countries and international organizations alike, the foundations of liberalism and the presumed universality of their objectives. We oscillate between interests and noble sentiments. But in a “multicentric” world, a state can have international interlocutors other than states: the NGOS, multinationals, identity-based entrepreneurs such as diasporas, and so on. The irruption of companies in the international game is a possible asset for Armenia, if it knows how to establish relations with its diasporas, for example, which can play an important role in this new cartography of international players. But for this to happen, we need to develop a valid institutional framework between the Armenian diaspora and the State, to turn it into an instrument of power and foster a reciprocal valorization that would be a tool of smart power. But we are still a long way from an efficient strategic plan that would involve the Armenian diasporas in a sustainable development project for the country. This is as much a process as an outcome. But mistrust, fear of diaspora interference in the Armenian political landscape and many other factors limit a genuine contractual State/diaspora policy that would make the diaspora a fully-fledged partner, working together for Armenia's policy of affirmation in a difficult environment (see Hyestart /diaspora and development). It should be stressed that it is political institutions that most often explain a country's failure or success, and not just geographical or cultural determinism. An inclusive policy is a source of success, an incentive to invest or innovate.
THE RESOURCE PORTFOLIO
The example chosen here is that of digital technology as a lever for development and an area of prime importance. Before the war, Armenia was one of the world's leading software development centers, and a regional hub for the design of integrated circuits and network and communication systems. Many would argue that the growth of Armenia's technology sector was rooted in the country's Soviet past, alluding to the likes of Hovannes Adamian (inventor of color television) and Boris Babayan (pioneer of the Soviet Union's supercomputers). However, politics has also played a major role in Armenia's promising technology scene. Over the past twenty years, at the request of the International Monetary Fund, Armenia has implemented successive reforms to encourage foreign investment.In 2019, N. Pashinyan’s new government took the decision to replace progressive tax levels with a single flat tax of 23%, In addition, another law that has been passed provides for no tax on profits and an income tax of just 10% for new companies with fewer than 30 employees, this has had the effect of attracting startups from all over the world. But government policy seems to favor what compliments the world of commerce the most, without thinking that Armenian technological innovation should be applied to all economic sectors to become a real tool for development and social progress. The development of the entrepreneurial spirit is the leitmotiv of this government, and the consensus that Armenia should above all support economic development as a whole, regardless of how wealth and development are distributed among the population, remains an important factor in a widely held vision: autonomy through the market.
We certainly don't want philanthropic diasporas any more, but investors, and the country's budget will most certainly be dedicated in large part to rearmament, so how do we get out of the gift policy and gift economy that works better for American diasporas than for European ones? Would the creation of a sovereign bond market be a solution? A diaspora bond? In the case of “diaspora bonds”, the mechanism is far less emotional than the transfer of funds by diasporas to help their relatives, and involves more rationalities: level of financial education of the diaspora, critical financial performance threshold, subscription process, guarantees... right down to the capital of trust in the State, the issuing institution and its intermediaries. But recent statements by N. Pashinyan in Zurich. Worst of all, his remarks seem to call into question the punishable nature of the genocidal act and its apprehension by the historiography of genocide. What are we proposing? to write a univocal and definitive history? These policies of forgetting are supposed to please Armenia's new partners and fulfill objectives in the present, but are subject to political evolution. We won't go into this particular aspect of Armenian government policy here, but we will point out that reactions were immediate to what some already consider censorship. Let's return to the question of how to sustain diaspora investment. When asked about the government's instruments for encouraging investment, the answers remain vague and information hard to find. The absence of an information portal on savings, investment (too many different channels), insurance to protect investments, etc. is lacking. The absence of a clearly defined administrative framework is a major obstacle. On the other hand, the country's security situation is not conducive to massive investment. The choice of the West and the agreements signed with the United States are not a sufficient guarantee: the treaty in no way commits the USA in the event of aggression by Azerbaijan, for example.
Armenian know-how in many fields is well established, but this expertise is only publicized through well-known individuals. State policy in this area needs to be fine-tuned, moving from a function-based organization to a skills-based operating model. Globalization highlights the fact that the war for talent is giving way to a war for skills. The skills of state employees, for example, can be seen as an issue of national sovereignty, and must therefore be placed at the heart of Armenian public policy. It's not just a question of finding investors for projects, however interesting they may be, but also of thinking about managing the resources and skills of Armenians: training and the education system are at the forefront of these considerations, since they are the crucible for building skills and monitoring their development. To do this, we first need to identify strategic skills, both present and future, and their current and projected volume. Let's repeat: it's all very well to defend the entrepreneurial spirit, but we need to provide it with effective frameworks.
Upheavals in both business and technology are accelerating the obsolescence of technical skills. This is one of the reasons for the new appeal of “soft skills”, and a Harvard study in 2022 showed that the main skill of the future will be “learning to learn”. In this respect, Armenia and its youth are a definite asset. Flexibility and adaptability to new technologies, as well as a high level of education, make it possible to envisage a knowledge-based strategy, which moreover corresponds to an Armenian cultural tradition, even at the time of the Soviet Union. To achieve this, we need to coordinate public policies and private initiatives. Human capital is one of the Armenian state's key assets.
The diasporas' demand for a more institutional economy of change (administrative or jurisdictional policy) is matched by a similar demand on the part of the government: better management, targeting and efficiency of the aid provided by the diasporas. There is therefore an opportunity for positive dialogue and exchange for various investments in Armenia's development policy. The sectoral approach still seems to be the most successful, particularly in the health sector, where joint financing between the state and private donors is possible. It is to be hoped that funding for public health projects will be increasingly integrated into the national system, enabling the public health sector to plan certain projects over the medium to long term. While the political-institutional aspect is important, it remains to be hoped that the diasporas and their various funding bodies will think about their modes of intervention.
The reform of the budgetary and fiscal process has not solved everything in Armenia, but the adoption of a budget has increased the willingness of donors to invest, while the institutional system remains too fragmented. More effective inter-ministerial coordination, particularly of aid received from the diaspora (aid management strategy), is important to ensure that strategic government choices are implemented. We always come back to the need to establish a different relationship between the State and diasporas, making it clear that it would be a serious political error not to take account of the importance of diasporas as a power factor. The primary mission of government communication is to inform citizens of the public policies pursued by political power, in a context where the State's message must be expressed in the midst of a multitude of others. The best example of this is N. Pashinyan's remarks in Zurich, where the government's approach to genocide was “thrown out” in an abrupt manner, dealing with psychological, social and historical issues without defining terms, notions and concepts, which immediately led to his remarks being likened to propaganda.
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY, SOFT POWER OR NATION BRANDING
Cultural action is a tool of a country's foreign policy. Since Joseph Nye, soft power's action on “hearts and minds” has made it a tool of seduction, influence and outreach. Cultural diplomacy, a French invention of the late 19th century, has long been formalized.
Symbolic hegemony now counts just as much as the classical, material determinants of power. The wars in Ukraine and Armenia highlight a change in the nature of conflicts, rather than a “return of power” (Badie.2022). As Bertrand Badie points out, not everything depends on power relations alone. Cultural diplomacy, which focuses on the use of culture by states in their foreign policy, has been joined by soft power, a tool of influence that can involve diasporas, for example, and nation branding, a concept coined by Wally Olins, which can be summed up as a marketing vision of diplomacy. As a tool of visibility and prestige, culture has become a vector of influence on the international stage. Cultural strategies are increasingly targeted to support their political impact. Culture must not only seduce, but also influence ideas and knowledge, with a view to both influence and attractiveness. Culture has long been a factor in the formulation of foreign policy (Gerbault 2008, Bellanger 1994).
The richness of the cultural landscape, the ability to renew stereotypes and the representations that foreigners have of a collective identity that refers to a set of narratives that describe the Nation are crucial issues. All this is part of an attractiveness strategy for individuals, companies and public opinion alike (Tessler 2010). We therefore need to update the various Armenian cultural models according to a set of contemporary criteria. Cultural identity can no longer be confused with immutable crystallizations, just as identity is not “a continuous totality” that is stable and simply transmissible. It's a dynamic phenomenon that depends to a large extent on the creativity of the various players and their encounter with a historical anchor. It's a set of complex, singular processes through which the Armenian cultural actor gives meaning to his or her “being Armenian”. Renewal need not frighten, or be experienced in terms of loss or oblivion.
If culture is a kind of ideological missile for Turkey or Azerbaijan, what about its use by the Armenian state or Armenian diasporas?
Without minimizing the role of individual players (NGOs, foundations, philanthropists, etc.) in the geopolitics of globalized culture, the role of States remains important. Considering new players, partners or at least certain roles is essential in light of the new situation affecting the Armenian world. It's not a question of turning otherness into strangeness. Defending the music of Komitas and raising awareness of Armenian manuscripts is a matter of course, as is the contribution of these cultural objects to world culture. But in the particular situation facing the Armenian world, we need to grasp how cultural identity must be conceived in terms of the resources that can be mobilized at this precise time and in the present to build it, and the strategies to be used to disseminate it. Breaking out of fixed representations or reified cultural habitus, adapting to situational demands and current socio-political constraints is a major challenge if we are not to lose our soul while using and understanding the role of culture in the geopolitical game. Both Turkey and Azerbaijan have grasped the importance of this at a time when geo-culture has taken off in an unprecedented way. Information and culture are emerging as the new sources of influence and legitimacy, and the ability to produce cultural objects, as well as the ability to produce information around them, is becoming a new standard for assessing power. Armenian institutions and diasporic associations are far from having grasped the stakes (lack of diversification of information and communication channels, content aimed at public opinion, etc.). The diplomacy of the public is still poorly understood, and it is surprising that the identity experienced is so different from the identity assigned by others.
Cultural governance needs to be reviewed both at home and in the diasporas.
It is important, for example, to have a clearer idea of the individuals, groups or institutions that can play the role of cultural agents, i.e., those who mobilize or coordinate resources aimed at supporting artists and creating new networks, those who support cultural and creative industries, and those who work to promote knowledge and exchanges. The diasporas are good potential cultural agents in this sense, but we also need expertise and consultation centers, as well as a genuine network that can create or consolidate relationships with international institutions and foreign audiences. The development of several models according to a set of contemporary criteria is necessary, as is a precise analysis of the field of action and intervention with the various public and private players. Armenia, for example, boasts a high level of digital performance in the country, which opens up vast possibilities in the cultural field, notably the production of artistic content in real time, enabling innovative partnerships. We can't ignore the new geopolitics of culture, otherwise Armenian production will be confined to a “folk festival” for the pleasure of audiences fond of world culture. It is urgent to situate Armenia and its diasporas on the new cartography of cultural exchanges. Thinking about culture, or doing culture, also means doing politics, in the true sense of the word, taking into account power issues and building a community of destiny.
What kind of culture do we want to show others in order to make ourselves known or recognized? “Ultimately, there is nothing more international than the construction of a national identity” (Anne-Marie Thiesse). The writing of history is also the history of the cultural choices shown to the world. New players for a new geopolitics of culture, using modern means of influence in an increasingly multipolar world where centers of power are changing, leaving more room for emerging cultures.
Culture is a tool of power and persuasion, and the Azerbaijani government is well aware of this. From press trips, symposia and university forums to sporting events and artistic patronage, the country's government has made perfect use of the entire cultural spectrum for its communication and propaganda. The stumbling block in this well-oiled system remains one of the hallmarks of the liberal system: the reputation or image reflected back to others. COP29 is a good example: the absence of certain heads of state, the director of the organization discussing investment with SOCAR, the arrest of human rights defender Amar Mammadli and his wife, the anti-French campaign and interference in the affairs of New Caledonia, all of these put a few grains of sand in the Azerbaijani communication machine.
Despite everything, the dictatorship of fossil fuels has its limits, and the large number of international players who are autonomous from the world of states means that companies can be included in the national game. When it comes to strategies for international cultural relations, Armenia has a number of important assets: cultural material, the training of actors and a large diasporic network. The EU, which looks set to become an important partner for Armenia, has, like other entities, areas of work that could prove useful for the country: support for culture as a driving force behind social and economic development, intercultural dialogue and the strengthening of cultural heritage. The richness of Armenian culture is an “amplifier of dynamics”, not only through its endogenous effects, but also through the perception that non-Armenians have of the country. We shouldn't be naïve in thinking that cultural encounters alone will lead to a better understanding of others, but Armenia has works of art and artists or intellectuals who can represent it on the international stage and serve as real soft power.
CONCLUSION
At a time of great fragility such as the one the country and its people are experiencing, it is clear that the effectiveness of the State is essential. The aim of this article was to highlight the possibilities and opportunities available to a small country emerging from conflict. It appears that the peace process must certainly go hand in hand with the process of strengthening the state, as part of an evolution in the relationship between state and society, and to this end, intelligent communication that restores a sense of community is important.
Cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy and the establishment of relevant economic structures all depend on the state's ability to provide key services. The war has undermined the country's cohesion; understanding expectations and grasping social perceptions is also an important issue, as it is the means of enabling a society to articulate the demands made of it in a complicated period for both the country and society. Armenia has long belonged to what have been defined as “hybrid political orders”, a state that seems to operate according to the rules of constitutional democracy, but where rival socio-political forms such as oligarchy coexist. It is looking for new partners, but as in many countries in the region, expectations are both traditional and modern. The war has shaken up the Armenian people and their diasporas, and is taking place in a new global environment that has major implications for Armenia. It also calls into question the formation of the Armenian state, as well as structural cleavages within the country: the formation of differences within the Armenian population (class, culture, gender, center/periphery relations, etc.).
War and its consequences have called into question the legitimacy of procedures (peace processes in particular), but also the legitimacy obtained through shared convictions and, finally, collective identity such as socialization structures (nationalism, religion, gender, etc.). Strengthening the state also means reinforcing systems of trust between the state and society, in order to achieve a broader community of views. Remember that social cohesion is an important vector when it comes to power. Obviously, it's easier to envisage solutions in an article, but Armenia has a major asset - its human capital, but also its culture, an extensive diasporic network, a large capital of sympathy and empathy, among others - which enable it to envisage solutions for its future and define strategies for its future.
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